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Abstract 
Economic science has – lamented by some, applauded by others – turned into a 
monistic discipline. In this short research note, a socio-economic answer to the 
question of why this has happened is provided by combining an economic 
approach to the market for economic ideas with a sociological approach to a 
scientific (power) field.  
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1. Introduction 
As several studies have shown, pluralism in economics is a bygone assumption 
(see e.g. Heise/Thieme 2016, Lee 2009). This statement assumes that economics 
had been characterized by pluralism in earlier times. Indeed, the period until 
World War II is often described as a pluralistic period (see e.g. 
Morgan/Rutherford 1998), and the 1960s and 1970s also experienced a rise in 
pluralism after what has been dubbed the ‘The Second Crisis in Economic 
Theory’ (see Robinson 1972). For some, most notably the heterodox faction of the 
economic scientific community and many students, this is a lamentable 
development and claims for a re-pluralization have been made1. For others, it is 
the necessary and therefore applauded result of a science reaching maturity.  
Much ink has been spilled on the discussion about the need for pluralism and the 
effects (cost or benefit respectively) of its loss (see e.g. Salanti/Screpanti 1997, 
Garnett/Olson/Starr 2010), much less has been written to provide a clear 
conceptualization of pluralism (see e.g.Garnett 2006)2, and even less investigated 
is the reason for or background forces of the development from ‘inter-war 
pluralism to post-war neoclassicism’ (Morgan/Rutherford 1998). For those who 
believe economics ought to be monist, in the sense that it eventually spawns a 
‘normal science’ of the Kuhnian type, there simply is no question to reflect upon 
(see e.g. Goodfriend 2007). For those, however, who advocate pluralism (see e.g. 
Salanti/Screpanti 1997, Kellert/Longina/Waters 2006, Fullbrook 2008, 
Garnett/Olsen/Starr 2010), its absence must be disturbing, and an explanation is 
badly needed in order to propose remedies that might reverse the process of de-
pluralization in the future.  
John King, a staunch defender of pluralism, is among the few who has provided 
an answer to “why economics has turned out this way”; nevertheless, he 
concedes: “and I am still not sure to have the full answer” (King 2016: 7). He 
highlights two reasons: 
* the pretention that economics is a ‘rigorous science’ demands a single, generally 
accepted representation of the ‘truth’ based on formal reasoning and sophisticated 
empirical testing (i.e. the methodology of positivistic fallibilism) 
* the economic discipline touches too much on vested interests to allow for a free 
investigative project pursuing every possible trail of thought. 
                                                          
1
 Most recently, this has been done in a volume titled ‘Reclaiming Pluralism in Economics’ edited by 
Courvisanos/Doughney/Millmow (2016) 
2
 One of the major problems in the discussion on pluralism versus monism is the obscurity of the terms used. 
Pluralism (and the same holds for monism) may be applied to theories, methods, methodologies, 
epistemologies, ontologies and paradigms – all conveying a different meaning. If not stated otherwise, the 
term pluralism (or monism) used here always refers to paradigmatic pluralism. This implies the existence and 
tolerance of adversarial scientific research programs with respect to their heuristic dimensions beyond mere 
epistemological or methodical variations within a paradigm; for a more detailed discussion see Heise (2017) 
and Fullbrook (2013). 
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While both explanations may appear intuitive to critical minds, they are not 
entirely convincing on closer inspection from a perspective not so inclined, or, 
rather, they need further argumentative support to become more appealing. That is 
what this short research note seeks to provide: In the next two sections, I will 
scrutinize the arguments and point out deficiencies. In a fourth and fifth section, I 
will unfold a socio-economic theory of the ‘market for economic ideas’ and 
provide some evidence for restraints on competition (or, sociologically speaking, 
an uneven battlefield) which will support King’s explanations. This will serve as a 
foundation for some proposals for re-claiming pluralism. 
 
2. Methodological ineptitude and the quest for monism 
Although economics is arguably the strictest social science in its methodological 
rigour (see e.g. Freeman 1999; Colander 2005), economists are usually not very 
well trained in terms of methodology (see Caldwell 1988). By that I mean that in 
relying on positivistic fallibilism, economics emulates the natural sciences in its 
search for ‘the one and only truth’. The insistence on positivistic (‘scientific’) 
‘objectivity’ as opposed to normative ‘advocacy’ marked the beginning departure 
of economics from economic sociology as a result of the ‘Methodenstreit’ which 
took place in Germany and elsewhere at the end of the 19th century (see Moore 
2003). Economics turned into a science – emphasizing methodological unity with 
the natural sciences (see e.g. Mirowski 1989)3 – claiming to be “a body of 
systematized knowledge concerning what is”  (Keynes 1891: 34) or, as Milton 
Friedman stated in his famous article ‘The Methodology of Positive Economics’: 
Positive economics is in principle independent of any particular ethical 
position or normative judgement. … Its task is to provide a system of 
generalizations that can be used to make correct predictions about the 
consequences of any change in circumstances. …Its performance is to be 
judged by the precision, scope, and conformity with experience of the 
predictions it yields. In short, positive economics is, or can be, an 
‘objective’ science, in precisely the same sense as any of the physical 
sciences. (Friedman 1953: 4).   
Based on such a fallacy, economics is pursued by most economists4 as a science 
that ultimately will provide a single, generally accepted, historically unspecific 
answer to all economic problems (see e.g. Middleton 1998: 344, Schultze 1996: 
26, Williamson 1997: 365); i.e. something that can be taken as ‘truth’:  
…a thumbnail sketch of what a genuine science of economics would 
amount to: it would ideally be a discipline that sought a complete, 
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 It has been claimed, though, that many natural sciences such as Physics have undergone a ‚pluralistic turn‘ 
in the past which the economic discipline is still lacking; see Fullbrook (2014). 
4
 It must be condeded that this perspective cannot solely be attributed to mainstream or orthodox economists 
but is also assumed by many heterodox economists; see e.g. Van Bouwel (2004), Freeman/Kliman (2006), 
Holcombe (2008). 
objective account of the ‘laws of motion’ which would causally explain 
the ‘characteristics’ and ‘function(ing)’ of the investigator-independent 
economic ‘system’ in its parts and as whole. Although this conception of 
an economic science does not deny ontological complexity and diversity 
and does not deny human fallibility, it does lend itself to an ultimately 
monistic paradigmatic vision of the future of the economics discipline 
(Mariyani-Squire/Mossa 2015: 200).         
This strong scientific claim matches neither the necessary ontological and 
epistemological preconditions that the object of inquiry – the economic order – 
must fulfil if ‘truth’ is to be established nor a similarly rigorous methodological 
exigency that is critically disclosed (see Heise 2017). The foundation of scientific 
monism, the ‘one world-one truth’ principle, can be upheld only under very 
restrictive and unrealistic conditions: a) the existence of a single (economic) 
reality and the objectivity of its emergence, which is questioned by post-modern 
constructivism (see Berger/Luckmann 1966); b) the assumption that the economic 
order (or system) is a ‘closed system’ which would exclusively allow for 
(stochastic) predictions based on detectable links between system elements 
(constituting ‘analytic judgement a priori’ in a Kantian sense). Although this 
assumption is highly dubious and definitely cannot be taken as an 
(unquestionable) axiom, this is exactly what mainstream economics5 does:  
It is indeed the proclaimed virtue of general equilibrium reasoning that it 
takes into account all the possible interactions between all the elements 
that are included in the model; therefore, if uncertainty about future 
possibilities appears to prevent the completion of the set of connections 
between present decisions and their full set of consequences, then we must 
agree that the imaginative response of Arrow and Debreu in extending the 
set of elements to include all future dates and all possible states of the 
world – which are fully connected to every other element in the model – 
was methodologically appropriate (Loasby 2003: 291).  
However, what is methodologically appropriate for concise model-building is not 
necessarily appropriate for the representation of reality.  
If the ontological and epistemological requirements for a monist approach are too 
demanding to be fulfilled, one could still hope for a clear-cut discrimination 
between theoretical approaches by empirical testing – which by itself can only 
establish provisional or conjectural knowledge but no ‘truth’. Yet, due to the 
‘problem of induction’ and the so called ‘Duhem-Quine’ thesis, an objective 
demarcation between ‘truth’ and ‘non-truth’ or a similar objective discrimination 
between competing theories or theoretical systems (paradigms) is simply 
impossible (see Blaug 1980: 26). This does not ultimately imply the complete 
rejection of the existence of objective knowledge (as constructivists would claim), 
                                                          
5
 As is common, I take the ‘dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model’ as the core of mainstream 
economics; see e.g. Carlin/Soskice (2006: 574ff.) who dub it the ‘neoclassical benchmark model’ covering 
neo-Keynesian as well as new classical macroeconomics based on microeconomic foundations.  
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but undoubtedly it implies the end of certainty concerning the establishment and 
proof of objective knowledge – which is thus replaced by the admittance of 
ontological and epistemological pluralism as a scientific imperative of economics. 
Monism, therefore, is not the logical result of the pretence that economics is like 
the natural sciences and the indicator of its maturity; rather it follows from a 
methodological error regarding the ontological and epistemological constraints of 
the discipline, thus making paradigmatic pluralism indispensable. 
 
3. Vested interests and economics 
There is no doubt that economics covers topics that are deeply affected by vested 
interests. Moreover the ‘knowledge’ provided by economics surely helps special 
interest groups to gain the upper hand in disputes about policy-making and the 
provision of public goods which simply cannot serve in a ‘neutral (or merely 
functional) way’ the general welfare of society for the reason that such a thing – 
the welfare of society – cannot coherently be conceptualized. Since Kenneth 
Arrow’s seminal book (Arrow 1951), we know that what contributes to the 
welfare of a society is, at best, determined by the majority or, more realistically, 
by the minority who are able to frame their particular interests as the common 
interest of the wider society (see e.g. Bartels 2008; Hacker/Pierson 2010; 
Häring/Douglas 2012). This framing process requires considerable resources 
which can better be provided if one is successfully participating in the market – 
which, in turn, results in a pro-market bias. Taking into consideration that 
universities, the major organisations of knowledge-creation, are in many countries 
private enterprises, it appears difficult to deny that economic research and 
education at these private universities may well also display a pro-market bias and 
disparage more critical approaches – not necessarily as a downright conspiracy 
but rather as the result of a cultural constraint imposed by the patrons of the 
private universities6. But even if this description were right, how would that 
translate into a general discrimination against critical approaches if it is conceded 
that the vast majority of universities around the world are public organizations 
which are free to follow other – less pro-market oriented theories and paradigms – 
currents? Why should that part of the economic scientific community not under its 
patrons’ tutelage still reject scientific pluralism given that monism is clearly 
untenable? 
 
4. The market for economic ideas 
                                                          
6
 For a classical account of the governance of universities acting as business corporations see Veblen (1918). 
For a historical account of some cases of individual harassment leading ultimately to the foundation of the 
American Association of University Professors in 1915 particularly promoting academic freedom see Haskell 
(1996).  
The practice of basic economic research and education is concentrated in 
universities. The market for economic ideas is, therefore, determined by the way 
scientific personnel (as ‘factors of production’) – mainly professors – are recruited 
and the way university researchers conduct their research in a methodological and 
paradigmatic manner (as ‘production programme’ or ‘technology’). The output 
provided by the market for economic ideas – basic economic research – is a pure 
public good (see Eggertsson 1995: 206) with the particular characteristic of a 
credence good unveiling its value to the consumer only after consumption, if at 
all. Although these characteristics imply that it has no price, it means neither that 
basic research will not be privately supplied nor that there are no means to govern 
the market for economic ideas.7 What it means is that the demand side of the 
market is not controlled by those who pay for its provision – which, at least in 
most public universities, is the general tax payer or, if tuition is charged, the 
student – but by the scientific community itself (see Menand 1996: 7) which 
enjoys academic freedom. 
The private provision of the public good ‘basic economic research’ is motivated 
either by being a joint-product of academic education or because it serves an 
ideological purpose (see above) benefitting the financier of the private 
universities. And because the price does not regulate the market, rewards such as 
attention and reputation must take its place. And again, it is the scientific 
community, not the tax payer or the student, that bestows such attention and 
reputation on the producer since the basic economic research is a credence good. 
This, of course, constitutes the need for standards determining what is good 
scientific practice and output and measuring its quality as the basis for reputation-
assignment. Moreover, the ‘market for economic ideas’ is distinguished further by 
characteristics that call for the introduction of standards in order to govern it: at 
most times, it shows the combination of high supply (of academics qualified to 
take a professorship) and low demand (for tenured professors) resulting in a quasi-
permanent excess-supply (‘shrink market’)8 and rendering it very risky. This is 
particularly the case because the attainment of a (tenured) professorship requires 
the acquisition of high and very specific human capital that can hardly be utilized 
in any other profession (see Eggertsson 1995: 203) and is, thus, associated with 
high sunk cost.  
From this accrues a demand for standard-setting which mitigates the risks 
involved by providing guidelines for ontological, epistemological and 
methodological constraints that mark the boundaries between ‘good’ and ‘bad/no’ 
economics. On the other hand, due to network externalities, learning effects, and 
high sunk cost, the market for economic ideas is prone to develop ontological, 
epistemological, and methodological path-dependencies (see Morgan 2015), 
                                                          
7
 Some authors (e.g. Albert 2006, Mirowski 2004: 60, Wible 1998) question the applicability of economics to 
the investigation of the procurement of knowledge as insinuated by the metaphor of a ‘market of ideas’. This 
position is not assumed here as economics provide helpful tools to conceptualize public goods such as 
‘economic ideas’. 
8
 This characteristic of the market for economic ideas at the level of professorial appointments is not 
coincidental but necessary to the academic recruitment principle of ‘selection of the best’. 
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creating a situation of ‘lock-in’ which can be interpreted as a process of implicit 
standardization (see Arthur 1989). While in former times, when the scientific 
community was a very small, close-knit elite group of people knowing each other, 
gate-keeping into the academic system of economics had been provided by 
networking based on sociodemographic similarities (‘habitus’) and direct personal 
control9, this no longer functions after academic education has become mass 
education and the scientific community has been inflated enormously. Now, gate-
keeping is provided by ontological, epistemological, and methodological 
standardization, which is a rational regime from the perspective of the individual 
researcher (minimizing his risk) but may be dangerous from the perspective of the 
discipline if it strangulates the competition of ideas on paradigmatic grounds. And 
the process of ‘product differentiation’ which usually evolves in order to 
transform a ‘shrink market’ into a ‘niche market’ (characterized by a situation of 
‘excess-demand’), may provide theoretical variation within the ‘standard’ 
paradigm but not the required paradigmatic pluralism.10           
Yet, even if the market for economic ideas were prone to market failures which 
are disclosed in restricting paradigmatic competition, would not the victor – i.e. 
the one who manages to set the standards – be coincidental? Or, put differently, 
why should a market-apologetic paradigm prevail as King predicted (with 
reference to Karl Marx)11? 
 
5. Power, hierarchy and the economic battle field 
If one wants to predict the outcome of a process of standardization, one needs to 
know the direct benefits of different candidates (i.e. competing paradigms) to its 
(potential) users and the benefit that results from network externalities (i.e. the use 
that stems from the fact that the paradigm is used by others) which are related to 
the number of users (see e.g. Elsner 2012: 166ff.). In this very setting, the process 
of standardization may become random, once the initial conditions satisfy a high 
degree of equality throughout the distribution of users across different paradigms. 
But even if that were the case – which, of course, is not very realistic - other 
factors may contribute: the endowment of different paradigms (or, rather, their 
academic representatives) with economic (e.g. professorial positions and third 
party funding), social (e.g. networks within and without the scientific 
community), cultural (e.g. editorial board memberships on important journals) and 
symbolic capital (e.g. awards or highly visible positions beyond the university) 
will impact on the choice of and adherence to a paradigm as much as the weight 
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 Eggertsson (1995: 204) reports – with reference to Keynes – on the influence which Alfred Marshall had on 
the professorial appointments at British and overseas universities in the English-speaking world. 
10
 For the distinction between ‘variation’ and ‘pluralism’ see Heise (2014: 74ff.), Heise (2017). 
11
 See King (2016: 8) who cites Marx (1867: 10): “In the domain of Political Economy, free scientific inquiry 
meets not merely the same enemies as in all other domains. The peculiar nature of the material it deals with, 
summons as foes into the field of battle the most violent, mean and malignant passions of the human breast, 
the Furies of private interest”. 
that must be assigned to network externalities, assuming that some users are more 
powerful than others in the economic field.  
Recent work on the socio-economics of economics has been very illuminating in 
this respect: Taking ‘economic ideas’ as being an international public good (see 
Eggertsson 1995: 207) and the economic system as being strictly hierarchically 
structured  (see Fourcade/Ollion/Algan 2015: 96ff.), a handful of private, elite US 
universities became the key-players in the standardization game. They control the 
journals which frame topics and bestow excellence on research(ers), they set the 
curriculum of Ph.D. programmes world-wide where the ontological, 
epistemological, and methodological tool-kit is passed on to the next generation of 
researchers (see Hodgson/Rothman 1999). These universities are not only 
extremely well equipped with economic capital (each elite US university 
commands a hundred times more financial resources compared to public 
universities world-wide), they rose to excellence under the cultural pretence that 
universities need to be beneficial to the society in order to gain legitimacy and 
acceptance. In a society – the USA – in which the market as the core constituent 
plays a crucial role in determining not only output and prices, but in legitimizing 
income aspirations and wealth distribution in a purely meritocratic way12, it is 
hard to see how the economic discipline could not have developed a pro-market 
bias (see Fourcade 2009: 33ff.). And even after their strong grip on the system had 
been loosened slightly (and, only temporarily, as it turned out) during the 1960s, 
when the combination of political movements and the vast extension of the higher 
education system opened a ‘window of opportunity’ for economic pluralism, the 
situation could not be sustained as long as the endowment with the different kinds 
of capital remained as unequal as before.13 Moreover, standardization as a gate-
keeping measure became ever more important after personal control ceased to 
work in a world in which half of each age cohort takes up university study. In 
some countries (such as the UK), this standardization has become rather formal 
(see e.g. Lee 2007, Lee/Pham/Gu 2013). In others (such as Germany), it remained 
mainly informal, yet no less effective (see e.g. Heise/Sander/Thieme 2016). 
Although this research note is only concerned with the market for economic ideas, 
one might argue that the gist of the argument put forward here would presumably 
apply equally to other disciplines of the social sciences such as sociology or 
political science which, nevertheless, have remained pluralistic. I believe closer 
inspection would prove the crucial differences between the market for economic 
ideas and the markets for ideas of other social sciences: The other social sciences 
are in general more ‘applied’ (real world) sciences than economics14, requiring the 
accumulation of less specific but more general human capital with lower sunk 
cost. Moreover, the scientific pretentions of economics as compared to the other 
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 This is part of the ‘American dream’ and a founding principle of the United States of America, based on 
settlers escaping from feudal Europe with its social stratification based on descent (see e.g. Hochschild 1995 
and Hacker 2008).  
13
 For the development of heterodox economics see Lee (2009), King (2002) and Heise/Thieme (2016), 
Heise/Sander/Thieme (2016) with particular reference to Germany.  
14
 Economics, for instance, has much more often than other social sciences been criticized for relying overtly 
on formal rigorousness than on relevance or realism.  
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social sciences are different: None of the other social sciences would claim to 
provide ‘the one and only truth’ (‘erklären’; requiring a monist vision of the 
world) but rather a historically and institutionally backed understanding 
(‘verstehen’) of the social order, including the advocacy of normative positions 
(requiring a pluralism of approaches). Additionally, none of the other social 
sciences have developed axiomatic epistemologies that could claim to become a 
‘normal science’ of Kuhnian type and, finally, none of the other social sciences is 
as hierarchically structured as economics (see e.g. Fourcade/Ollion/Algan 2015: 
96ff.). Therefore, even if there was a demand for standardization within the other 
social sciences, this demand could not be met by a paradigmatic standardization 
along the lines of epistemological, ontological, and methodological monism.              
 
6. Re-claiming pluralism in economics 
John King is brave enough to concede that he is not sure of the answer to the 
question of why economics turned into a monist discipline based on a pro-market 
paradigm. And he is even less sure of what can be done to change this situation, 
yet proposes the following strategies: “...closer co-operation with each other 
(among the heterodox economists, A.H.), more interdisciplinary collaboration 
with the other social sciences, and pressure for political economy to be taught as a 
discipline in its own right, separate from departments of (mainstream) economics” 
(King 2016: 9). Although the quest to strengthen the ties among those members of 
the economic scientific community who are being discriminated against and to 
extend the ties beyond the disciplinary borders towards the more open-minded 
political and social sciences appears a sensible and comprehensible strategy, in 
combination with the proposal to claim heterodox economics as a distinct 
scientific discipline (‘Political Economy’), it can only be rated as surrender and 
retreat, i.e. a Dunkirk strategy.15  
Now that a socio-economic approach to economics has been presented, it must be 
accepted that a market such as the market for economic ideas, which is prone to 
market failure and is showing an extremely uneven battlefield in terms of the 
distribution of economic, social, cultural and symbolic capital, self-regulation in 
the sense of ‘good economic theories will eventually assert themselves’, cannot be 
expected.16 However, rather than deserting the market entirely, it might be better 
to try first to regulate the market in order to overcome its failures. As it would be 
naive to hope for a re-distribution of economic, social, cultural and symbolic 
capital in the economic field in the nearer future, regulation must create and 
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 It should be conceded that a Dunkirk strategy – as in the name-giving event – can be a successful retreat to 
a more defensible position. However, it would still involve surrendering the economic discipline to the 
mainstream.  
16
 Goldman/Cox (1996: 30f.) distinguish between ‘competition of ideas in an unregulated (free) market’ and 
an ‘adversarial system of discourse’, which are often confused. The former does not provide – due to the 
market failures put forward in part 2 – an optimal acquisition of knowledge, while the latter needs a 
regulatory framework in order to do so. It is this ‘adversarial system of discourse’ which only scientific 
pluralism can guarantee.  
secure a place for all economic theories and paradigms, including heterodox 
economics which bows to the methodological requirements of positivistic 
fallibilism17 in economics departments. This could, for instance, be achieved by 
introducing a ‘pluralism codex’ requiring the appointment of scientific staff from 
different paradigmatic backgrounds. This, again, could be controlled by ‘equal 
opportunity commissions’ and reinforced by providing financial incentives 
through public research funding bodies. 
Of course, to hope for such regulation may be judged equally naïve, considering 
the way the economics profession is. Still, there appears to be one gateway for the 
introduction of formal regulations: at the root of ‘self-regulation’ of the scientific 
community lies ‘academic freedom’. However, academic freedom not only 
passively safeguards the actors in the market for economic ideas against 
inappropriate interventions from the state; the concept of academic freedom also 
involves the obligation of the members of the scientific community (and the state) 
to create conditions under which the procurement of knowledge can be provided 
free from discrimination or harassment (see Mason/McCallum/Haiven 2015: 
9ff.)18. Based on the meta-theoretical foundations laid out in part 2, an appropriate 
organisation of the economics discipline must guarantee ontological, 
epistemological, and methodological pluralism in research and education, not only 
as an ethical principle but as a scientific imperative – non-compliance must be 
judged as a violation of academic freedom.  
Until now, the violation of academic freedom with respect to a lack of pluralism 
has been perceived only, if at all, at the level of a specific department (as, for 
instance, in the case of the University of Manitoba; see Mason/McCallum/Haiven 
2015). It ought to become a general device including the principle of ‘negative 
discrimination’ until a certain degree of pluralism has become established in every 
economics department and scientific pluralism has become a part of the ‘cultural 
capital’ of the discipline.                  
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 This concession is necessary to prevent a methodological ‘anything goes’ (which, at least, would clash with 
the scientific pretences of the economic discipline) and to avoid the ordinary accusation that pluralism means 
obscurantism (see Tirole 2014).  
18
 Coase (1974b) draws our attention to the fact that regulating commodity markets is viewed far less 
critically than regulating markets for ideas. The reason is that regulating markets for ideas is often feared to 
undermine the freedom to express such ideas. As we have argued, in case of the economics discipline, it is the 
special features of the market for economic ideas which are exactly undermining academic freedom if the 
market is left to self-regulation. We would still need to find an appropriate form of regulation, though, in 
order to avoid substituting one form of market failure with another.      
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